There is an on-going debate about whether health products, such as insecticide-treated bednets (ITNs) for protection against malaria, should be distributed for free or at a positive price to maximize ownership and use. One argument in favour of free distribution is related to positive externalities. Like vaccines, individual use of ITNs provides a community-wide protective effect against malaria even for non-users. In addition, price may act as a barrier to ownership particularly among those most at-risk who are frequently poor. Alternatively, charging a positive price may reduce donor dependence, more efficiently allocate nets to those most at risk of malaria, and encourage use through a hypothesized sunk cost effect, where individuals are more likely to use goods they pay for. Using a randomized experiment in Madagascar, we evaluate the impact of price on demand for and use of ITNs. We find that price negatively affects both demand and use of ITNs. When price increases by $0.55, demand falls by 23.1% points (CI 19.6-26.6; P < 0.01) and effective coverage falls by 23.1% points ; P < 0.01). We fail to find evidence of a screening effect for prices greater than zero, but households eligible for free ITNs are more likely to use them if they have more self-reported fevers in the household at baseline. We also fail to find evidence of a sunk cost effect, meaning that households are not more likely to use nets that they pay for. Our results suggest that: (1) only partially subsidizing ITNs significantly limits ownership and (2) distributing ITNs for free or at a small nominal price will maximize demand and effective coverage. Alternative sources of financing should be identified to completely (or almost completely) subsidize the cost of ITNs in order to maximize coverage of ITNs among poor populations at risk of malaria.
Introduction
There is an on-going debate about whether preventive health products, such as insecticide-treated bednets (ITNs), should be distributed for free or sold at a positive price. One of the main policy arguments in favour of free distribution is related to the positive externalities generated from the use of ITNs since individual use of ITNs provides a community-wide protective effect against malaria through an impact on vector control [World Health Organization (WHO) 2006a] . In addition, price may be a barrier to ownership of ITNs, particularly among the poor populations most at risk of malaria. On the other hand, charging a positive price, typically partially subsidized, has been used by social marketing programmes to motivate private distributors to ensure the long-term availability of nets and to reduce donor dependence [Lengeler and deSavigny 2007; Population Services International (PSI) 2015] . In addition, a positive price could theoretically generate a screening effect by efficiently allocating ITNs to individuals who value them the most (Ashraf et al. 2010) . Whereas, from a policy perspective, bednets are most valuable to individuals most at risk of malaria, there is conflicting evidence as to whether households that are more knowleadgeable about their malaria risk are more likely to demand bednets (Nganda et al. 2004; Garc ıa-Basteiro et al. 2011; Krezanoski et al. 2014 vs Agyepong and Manderson 1999; Sangaré et al. 2012) . A positive price could also create a sunk cost effect, based on a hypothesized psychological mechanism, where the act of paying for a good may increase the likelihood of using it in comparison to receiving it for free (Thaler 1980) . A growing body of experimental evidence investigates the effect of price on demand and use of ITNs among target populations. Cohen and Dupas (2010) provided the first results based on a randomized-controlled trial among pregnant women seeking antenatal care in rural Kenya. Their results showed that an increase in price significantly reduces both demand and use of ITNs and they failed to find evidence for a screening or sunk cost effect (Cohen and Dupas 2010) . Another randomized evaluation among micro-lending clients in India found that individuals eligible for free ITNs had the highest ITN ownership and, contrary to expectations, usage was highest when ITNs were free (Tarozzi et al. 2014) . Only one study has been conducted among a general population and confirmed, in rural Kenya, that demand for ITNs is price elastic and net usage is not higher among individuals who paid more for the net (Dupas 2009 (Dupas , 2014 . Our study provides experimental evidence among a general population at risk of malaria in Madagascar on the effect of price on demand and use of ITNs. Focusing on the general population is particularly relevant given the WHO goal of universal coverage of ITNs for all individuals at risk of malaria (WHO 2013a) . In addition, the general population may have different valuation of their health, knowledge about malaria, and willingness to purchase and use ITNs than targeted groups.
Background
World-wide, $3.2 billion individuals are at risk of malaria infection. In 2015, there were an estimated 438 000 deaths due to malaria world-wide, most of which occurred among children under 5 years of age in sub-Saharan Africa (WHO 2015a) . The international community has consistently identified malaria control as one of its highest priorities for improving development, setting ambitious targets for reducing malaria incidence and mortality 90% by 2030 in the Sustainable Development Goals (WHO 2015b) . Use of ITNs has been an important contributor towards the 60% decline in malariarelated mortality from 2000 to 2015 (WHO and UNICEF 2015) and accounting for an estimated 68% of the cases averted (Bhatt et al. 2015) .
The WHO currently recommends universal coverage with ITNs for all individuals at risk of malaria at a ratio of 1 net per 1.8 persons (WHO 2013a) . The recommended approach includes mass distribution campaigns of free ITNs and routine continuous distribution of free ITNs through antenatal and immunization clinics. Ultimately, mass distribution campaigns would give way to continuous distributions channels through health facilities, with mass campaigns used as adjuncts to sustain coverage. Non-free ITNs through the private sector are envisioned to play a supplemental role in ensuring universal coverage (WHO 2013a) .
Almost all African countries with on-going malaria transmission have adopted policies to support mass distribution of free ITNs and estimated coverage has improved from 2% in 2000 to 55% in 2015 (WHO 2015a) . Despite WHO recommendations for universal coverage, many countries in policy or practice continue to target primarily pregnant women and children under five years of age (WHO 2013b (WHO , 2015a . There continue to be insufficient funds to meet the WHO goal of universal coverage with ITNs, with an estimated requirement of 300 million additional ITNs per year for distribution (WHO 2015a) . Currently, access to ITNs in many households is dependent on private sector providers selling partially subsidized nets. In addition, a number of African countries have adopted policies to directly sell ITNs, including some countries with national-level programmes (Willey et al. 2012; WHO 2013b) . Given funding limitations, charging a positive price for ITNs may continue to be an attractive practical option to bridge the funding gap between current funding limitations and the goal of universal coverage with ITNs.
In general, the studies examining the effect of price on demand and use of ITNs suffer from selection bias because the populations targeted for social marketing interventions may be different from those targeted by free mass distribution campaigns. Multiple studies
Key Messages
• We evaluate the effect of price on demand for and use of anti-malarial bednets using a randomized controlled intervention.
• Consistent with a downward sloping demand curve, demand falls as price increases.
• There is no evidence of a screening effect at prices greater than zero: households with more self-reported fevers at baseline are not more likely to demand or use a bednet.
• Households eligible for free bednets are more likely to use them if they have more self-reported fevers in the household at baseline.
• Even partial subsidization of health products, such as bednets, is insufficient to overcome barriers to demand and use; effective coverage will be maximized when bednets are distributed for free or close to free.
have confirmed that price may be a significant barrier to net ownership, particularly in poor, rural populations (Snow et al. 1999; Guyatt et al. 2002; Maxwell et al. 2006) . Studies have also shown that free distribution can eliminate financial barriers to net use (Curtis et al. 2003; Teklehaimanot et al. 2007; WHO 2007) . However, studies assessing social marketing and voucher programmes have shown that individuals are willing to pay some nominal fee for ITNs (Schellenberg et al. 2001; Guyatt et al. 2002) . Recent experimental evidence has demonstrated that free nets are not more likely to be wasted and that price will not allocate nets to individuals who need them the most (Hoffmann 2009; Cohen and Dupas, 2010; Tarozzi et al. 2014) . However, only one other study focuses on the effect of price in the context of a general population at risk of malaria (Dupas 2009 (Dupas , 2014 .
Malaria in Madagascar
Malaria is transmitted primarily by Plasmodium falciparum in Madagascar. The entire population of Madagascar is at risk of malaria (WHO 2013b ), and 36% of children under 5 years and 35% of pregnant women sleeping under a bednet (INSTAT and ORC Macro 2005) .
In 2004, Madagascar adopted a policy to distribute ITNs free of charge, targeting pregnant women and young children. In practice, free ITNs were not available in the study location until after this study was completed. At the time of the experiment, bednets in Ambalavao were only available through social marketing programmes providing ITNs at partially subsidized prices through community health workers and selected retailers. 
Methods
We used a randomized-controlled design to evaluate the effect of price on demand for and use of ITNs. We randomly varied, at the village level, the price at which households could purchase an ITN. The treatment categories included a price of zero (free) up to the social marketing price available at that time in the market ($$2.20); the different possible price categories represented increments of $0.55 (equivalent to 1000 Ariary). 3 These prices represent subsidies equal to 100, 75, 50, 25% and no subsidy, relative to the social marketing price of ITNs, which represents a subsidized price compared with the retail price. As a benchmark, 61% of the population in Madagascar was living on < $1 per day in 2006 (WHO 2006b). The social marketing price of an ITN is equivalent to 2 days of individual consumption, and the price difference in our randomization categories is equal to half a day of individual consumption in Madagascar.
The experimental sample consisted of twelve rural villages randomly selected from among all villages within a five kilometer radius of the center of the semi-urban town of Ambalavao (population $12 000). Randomization was conducted by lottery with all the village leaders (Table 1) . 4 Once a village was selected into a price category, each household was given a voucher to purchase an ITN at the treatment price from a designated local vendor located in Ambalavao.
5 This distributor was selected as a convenient, centralized location since villagers typically travel to Ambalavao weekly for market day. Each household was eligible to purchase one ITN at the treatment price; the vendor maintained a list of the households and their treatment prices to prevent fraudulent purchases. Ethical clearance for this study was provided by local officials in the town of Ambalavao and the Médicin Inspecteur of Ambalavao. Additionally, the village chiefs provided approval for the study to take place in their village. Data collection was conducted only among households that gave verbal consent. Whether or not the household provided verbal consent, each household received one voucher according to the price level designated for their village. This 
Statistical analysis
We use a linear probability model where the binary outcome variable represents, in three separate regressions, whether the household: (1) owns an ITN, (2) uses the ITN and (3) uses the ITN conditional on owning one. We measure these outcomes based on ownership and use during the last month of data collection (i.e. April). Measurement during the last month of data collection was chosen to assess sustained use and ownership by the end of the malaria season, which is of most interest from a policy perspective. The unit of observation is the household. The first outcome, net ownership, measures demand for ITNs. Our second outcome measures use of ITNs not conditional on ownership, representing effective ITN coverage for households randomized to a certain price. This measure provides a policy relevant outcome identifying the effect of price on overall net use in a target population. In comparison, ITN use conditional on ownership measures use of nets among households that own them and relates specifically to use behaviour once a net is present in a household. The analysis for this outcome is nonexperimental since households self-select to demand a net at the randomly assigned price. The specification for the full regression is:
for household i in village j. The same specifications are employed for each outcome. The main coefficient of interest, b 1 , represents the effect of price on demand for ITNs, for this specification. Price j represents the price at which all households in village j were offered to purchase ITNs. Since price is measured in increments of $0.55, the coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of increasing price by this amount on the probability of owning an ITN at follow-up. We include household-level characteristics, defined as vector X i , to increase the precision of the estimate for the coefficient of interest by controlling for chance variation between the treatment categories. These variables include all non-missing baseline characteristics for the sample and any variables that are statistically different across the treatment groups at baseline. 6 We use a dummy variable adjustment to account for any observations with missing baseline values (Puma et al. 2009 ). Educ j represents a dummy variable for whether the village received the education campaign, and an interaction term with the price category is also included. Since the main interest of the study is the effect of price, we do not focus on the results of the education component, though it is controlled for in all specifications (see Endnote 4). The variation in the treatment occurs at the village level, thus the small sample size restricts the number of village-level characteristics that can be included. To capture village-level characteristics in one measure, we create a pre-intervention index variable (Demand_index ij ), which combines families of variables into one measure. In our case, the index is intended to reduce the number of cluster-level covariates in the regression. In other studies that have developed similar indices, such as Kling et al. (2007) and Bannerjee et al. (2015) , the indices are used to reduce the number of outcome variables due to concerns with multiple comparisons. Our index captures the effect of village-level characteristics at baseline on inherent household demand for ITNs, excluding the effect of price; equal weight is given to all village-level covariates to generate the index (Appendix Table A3 ). This pre-intervention index is generated by separately regressing demand for ITNs on the village-level characteristics; similar regressions are run for use of ITNs and use of ITNs conditional on ownership as the dependent variables. The component characteristics include village-level factors potentially associated with malaria risk (measured as the percentage of the village population with a history of self-reported fevers during the month prior to the intervention), data collector fixed effects, average village distance to water source, number of households per village, and age and years of education of the village chief. We use the predicted value from the regression (e.g. predicted demand) and normalize it using the mean and SD of that variable. This predicted value represents the probability of ITN demand or use as a function of village-level factors (i.e. a higher z-score for this variable shows a higher proportion of ITN demand or use by village because of different village-level factors) and it is included as a regressor in the full regression.
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In another specification, we estimate the following regression:
where we have included a proxy measure for a household's risk of malaria, measured by the history of self-reported fevers at baseline. This measure, defined as Fever i , represents the percentage of household members that self-reported having a fever during the previous month at baseline. We interacted this variable with price, as a way to isolate whether there exists a screening effect, identified as higher demand and use of ITNs among households with more self-reported fevers in the household at baseline. The coefficient, b 2 , represents whether, among households randomized into the same price category, those with more self-reported fevers in the household at baseline are more likely to own an ITN. The same specification is also run for the other outcomes of interest. For the analysis with conditional use as the dependent variable, we attempt to isolate the screening effect through this interaction term, showing whether households with more self-reported fevers in the household at baseline are more likely to use ITNs that they own. The coefficient on price, b 1 , can be interpreted as the sunk cost effect which shows whether households that pay more for an ITN are more likely to use it. The potential screening and sunk cost effects are not experimental in this last specification because we did not follow Ashraf et al. (2010) .
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The main results show tests of statistical significance using the small-sample t-distribution with 13 degrees of freedom, given the small number of clusters (12 villages). We estimate cluster robust SEs, clustered at the village level.
We conduct a number of robustness checks to validate our findings. First, we test other specifications that do not assume a constant effect of price on the outcomes. We test the effect of free vs positive prices, as well as dummy variables by price category, similar to Kohler and Thornton (2012) . Second, we use a probit model instead of a linear probability model. Third, we include village-level dummy variables instead of the village-level index. Fourth, we compare our results with the Wild bootstrap-t statistic estimations, following other experiments relying on randomization with fewer clusters (Burde and Linden 2013) , since cluster robust SEs with a small number of clusters can still result in over-rejection of the null hypothesis (Cameron et al. 2008) .
9 Last, we include probability weights, generated using baseline characteristics of experimental sample (see Appendix section "Generating probability weights to adjust for non-response"), to correct for any non-random sample attrition (Wooldridge 2002) .
Results

Baseline characteristics of the analytic sample
Seventy seven percent of the household heads in the analytic sample are male (Table 2) . Heads of household are 43-years old on average and have four years of schooling. On average, there are five individuals per household. Almost all households live in houses with dirt floors, thatched roofs and mud walls. None of the households have electricity, nor do they own a television or a telephone, but 8 in 10 own a radio. The household members tend to be farmers and own animals for consumption and income generation. Note: ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
At baseline, 12% of households report having had at least one household member ill with a fever during the last month. In the absence of blood smears, we use history of self-reported fevers as a proxy for malaria.
10 Only 3% of households owned a bednet at baseline, and 1% reported using a bednet. Although we use random assignment to balance differences in observable and unobservable characteristics in expectation, there are differences in certain observable characteristics across treatments, likely due to the relatively small sample of villages.
11 We include these baseline characteristics as covariates in the analysis to increase the precision of the coefficient of interest and reduce potential bias from these differences. We also present baseline characteristics for the sample lost to follow-up (Table 3) , consistent with recommendations for randomized evaluations (Dumville et al. 2006) . There are some differences between the analytic sample and the sample lost to follow-up: the analytic sample has lower years of educations for spouses and a lower probability of owning certain assets, but a higher probability of owning a radio. The analytic sample is slightly more likely to go out at night.
Unadjusted outcome data
The unadjusted results show that 39% of households own an ITN and 29% are using an ITN post-intervention (Table 4) . Conditional on owning an ITN, 73% are using an ITN, meaning 27% have unused ITNs. All of the households eligible for a free ITN redeemed their voucher. Consistent with economic theory of a downward sloping demand curve, demand for ITNs falls as price rises (Graph 1). Among households eligible for a net costing $0.55 (75% subsidy), almost three quarters of households demanded an ITN, compared with only 2% of households eligible for the social marketing price ($2.20).
Unadjusted results for net use (not conditional on ownership) also show a downward slope, even though the highest rate of ITN ownership is among households eligible for ITNs at $0.55 (Graph 2). Based on the CIs, effective net coverage is substantially higher among the households eligible for free nets, relative to households eligible for the social marketing price. Unadjusted net use conditional on ownership does not follow a clear pattern since we fail to reject that conditional use is equal for free ITNs vs ITNs at $1.10 (Graph 3). Note: ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
Regression results
First, we find that price negatively affects demand for ITNs, consistent with a downward sloping demand curve (Table 5 ). When price increases by $0.55, demand for ITNs decreases by 24.0% points (CI 19.1-28.9; P < 0.01) (column 1). The estimated effect is consistent (23.1% point decrease), when household-and village-level baseline characteristics are included. When price increases by $0.55 from free, demand falls by 28% relative to the regression-adjusted 83% ownership in the free category. Demand is relatively inelastic at low price levels (À0.39 at $0.55) but demand becomes more elastic at higher price levels (À1.25 at $1.10 À5.02 at $1.65). We estimate a price elasticity of À0.80 at mean price and mean ownership of ITNs.
In the third analysis, we interact price with history of selfreported fever. Within each price category, households with more self-reported fevers in the household at baseline are not more likely to demand an ITN. It is not possible to reject that there are no screening effects. The CI shows that we can reject a screening effect >6.9% points, meaning that households with a 1% more selfreported fevers in the household at baseline have < 7% point difference in demand for ITNs.
Second, we find that price has a negative impact on ITN coverage (Table 6 ). When price increases by $0.55, overall ITN coverage falls by 14.7% points (CI 1.5-27.9; P < 0.05) (column 1). When household-and village-level baseline variables are included, the effect size is 23.1% points (CI 19.6-26.6; P < 0.01). Relative to the regression-adjusted mean for effective coverage of ITNs among households eligible for free nets (90%), use falls by 26% when price increases by $0.55. Effective net coverage is highest when the price of ITNs is zero, compared with $0.55. We cannot conclude that net coverage is maximized when price is zero, since the intervention does not test small nominal price differences between 0 and $0.55. A sunk cost effect could exist at very small price increases above zero, but the intervention was not set up to detect such small differences. We find that households eligible for free ITNs with more selfreported fevers in the household at baseline are more likely to use their ITNs. There is no such effect among households eligible to pay a higher price (column 3).
Third, we do not find evidence that price affects the use of ITNs, conditional on ownership ( Table 7) . As noted, these results are nonexperimental, since households self-select to purchase a net. We fail to reject a sunk cost of zero, meaning we do not find that households who paid more for an ITN are more likely to use it. We can reject a sunk cost effect of 23.8% points or larger (column 3), meaning that the difference in the conditional use of nets is <24 % points when price is increased by $0.55. 12 Although we fail to reject a screening effect of zero, the large CI means that meaningful screening effects may still exist. Overall, the evidence shows that the reduction in effective ITN coverage as a result of price is due to the negative effect of price on demand for ITNs. There is no countervailing positive effect from price on use of ITNs, conditional on ownership. Our results fail to reject a screening effect of zero both for demand and use of ITNs for prices greater than zero. However, we do find higher overall use of ITNs among households eligible for free bednets if they have more self-reported fevers in the household at baseline.
Robustness checks
We conducted various robustness checks. First, we test different functional forms since price may not have a constant effect on demand and use. We find that being eligible to pay a positive price relative to Table A4 ). Providing free ITNs relative to charging any price will maximize demand but not use. When we include dummy variables for each price category, we find consistent evidence of a linear relationship between price and demand, though we cannot reject that the effect on demand is similar for $1.10 and $1.65 (Appendix Table A5 ).
There is suggestive evidence of a non-linear relationship between price and effective coverage, since we cannot reject that use is equal when price is free vs $0.55 or $1.10. Effective coverage is significantly higher when ITNs are free compared with the social marketing price and appears to be maximized at a price close to zero but not necessarily equal to zero. There is no evidence of a sunk cost effect. Our original specification uses a linear probability model, consistent with Angrist and Pischke (2009 We create probability weights to include in the regression analysis as a specification check to adjust for potential non-response bias resulting from differential loss to follow-up by price category. There may be differences by price category in the types of individuals who are included in the sample by follow-up, in this case with follow-up data from April. To correct for this potential source of bias, we modelled the probability of being in the sample at follow-up estimated separately by price category, as a function of the baseline characteristics that are available for the experimental sample. Because this method resulted in some probability weights representing extreme outliers (due to low response propensities), we performed a typical adjustment to the weights, whereby we sorted them into deciles and calculated an average weight within each decile. The inverse of the predicted probability of being part of the analytic sample is used as the probability weight for the main analyses. Essentially, the weights give more weight to observations in the analytic sample that are similar to those who were lost to follow-up so that the results are more similar to those we would have generated had there been no sample attrition.
model instead, the main results for demand and effective coverage are consistent (Appendix Table A6 ). The model for conditional use can only be estimated when certain baseline variables are dropped because they perfectly predict success. When we replace the villagelevel index with village fixed effects, the findings are similar (Appendix Table A7 ). We also include probability weights to weight observations in the analytic sample up to the observations in the experimental sample since sample attrition may affect the study's internal validity. The main results are not meaningfully affected (Appendix Table  A8 ), though we cannot rule out that unobservable factors, not included to generate the weights, may influence attrition.
Last, since there is concern that our tests of statistical significance may over-reject the null hypothesis because of the small number of clusters, we compare the P-values with those estimated using a Wild bootstrap-t. We find that the P-value using the Wild bootstrap-t continues to be <5% for the effect of price on demand (P ¼ 0.002) and use (P ¼ 0.012) and becomes larger for conditional use (P ¼ 0.597). In summary, our main results hold and demonstrate a statistically significant effect of price on demand and use of ITNs not conditional on ownership.
Discussion
Our evaluation demonstrates that increasing the price of ITNs significantly reduces both demand and effective coverage. When ITNs are free (100% subsidized), ITN coverage reaches between 49 and 90%, depending on the specification. Our findings are consistent with the other experimental results demonstrating a negative effect of price on demand and use of ITNs (Dupas 2009 (Dupas , 2014 Cohen and Dupas 2010; Tarozzi et al. 2014) . We find that, at a price close to zero, demand is relatively inelastic, reflecting a high willingness to purchase ITNs when price is close to zero. As price increases, the elasticity of demand increases. While Cohen and Dupas estimate a price elasticity of À0.37 at mean price and mean purchase probability, we estimate a larger elasticity (À0.80) at mean price and ITN ownership. The higher relative elasticity compared with Cohen and Dupas may reflect differences in the target population; this study focuses on the general population whose elasticity of demand for bednets is likely to be different than pregnant women seeking antenatal care, a prime target group for malaria prevention. We also fail to find evidence of a screening effect or a sunk cost effect at prices greater than zero, consistent with Cohen and Dupas (2010) . However, we do find that, among households eligible for free ITNs, those with more self-reported fevers in the household at baseline have higher effective coverage. This finding may be consistent with a signaling effect from providing a preventive product for free, consistent with World Bank (2015) and Hoffman (2009) . Households who perceive themselves as being more at risk of malaria may be interpreting free provision as a signal of encouragement to use the ITN. The absence of a positive correlation between a history of self- Robust SEs in parentheses. 95% CIs in square brackets. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. The regressions use a linear probability model. Each column represents a separate regression with the dependent variable indicated in the column heading. The independent variable of interest, defined as net price, represents the price category starting from zero, up to $2.20. Net price increases in increments of $0.55. Fever represents the percentage of household members that self-reported having had a fever during the previous month at baseline. This indicator is a proxy for malaria risk and the interaction is meant to isolate potential screening effects. Regressions (where marked) include baseline household level and village level characteristics (see Table 5 ), as well as a control variable for the education campaign and an interaction with net price. Robust SEs in parentheses. 95% CIs in square brackets. ***P < 0.01,**P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. The regressions use a linear probability model. Each column represents a separate regression with the dependent variable indicated in the column heading. The independent variable of interest, defined as net price, represents the price category starting from zero, up to $2.20. Net price increases in increments of $0.55. Fever represents the percentage of household members that self-reported having had a fever during the previous month at baseline. This indicator is a proxy for malaria risk and the interaction is meant to isolate potential screening effects. Regressions (where marked) include baseline household level and village level characteristics (index), as well as a control variable for the education campaign and an interaction with net price. Baseline household level variables include: ITN ownership and ITN use at baseline, age and education level of household head, household size, education of spouse, ownership of cattle, chicken, ducks, and cattle cart, housing material, roof material, number of bedrooms, number of beds, whether water source is considered far, distance to water source, type of water source own, whether go out at night, whether use mosquito coil, whether sought care for fever in last month, and whether purchased medicine for fever.
reported fever and demand and use for ITNs at a positive price is consistent with literature that calls into question whether households presumed to perceive themselves more at risk of malaria are necessarily more likely to value ITNs (Agyepong et al. 1999; Sangaré et al. 2012) .
Our findings complement the evidence related to other preventive health products, including deworming medications (Kremer and Miguel 2007) , water chlorination (Ashraf et al. 2010; and hand washing soap (Spears 2014) , which identifies a steep decrease in demand when price increases. Even partial subsidization of ITNs, through social marketing programmes, significantly limits ITN ownership and use. A price of zero or close to zero may represent a special threshold (Kremer and Glennerster 2011) . For example, providing free ITNs may be conveying a social norm and alter intra-household allocation of ITNs to different individuals depending on whether the household receives the ITN for free or pays for it instead (Hoffman 2009; World Bank 2015) . Alternatively, free ITNs may allow individuals to experience the value of these health products. Dupas (2014) shows that individuals who receive a free net are consequently more likely to pay a positive price in the future. Providing ITNs for free does not, however, guarantee particular levels of coverage. As a result, there may be a role for paying individuals to use ITNs, i.e. using 'negative prices' as shown in Madagascar (Krezanoski et al. 2010) , if the goal is to achieve particular target rates of ITN use.
One of this study's strengths is its implementation among a general population of poor households susceptible to malaria. Because the recent recommendation by the WHO focuses on universal coverage for all individuals at risk of malaria, it is important to understand demand and use of ITNs among the general population. Only Dupas (2014) provides similar evidence among the general population in Western Kenya. Other studies focus on pregnant women and micro-lending clients who may have a different valuation of their health and knowledge of malaria risk. Our findings inform policy related to pricing of ITNs in social marketing programmes since we provided access to ITNs in a way similar to these programmes.
One limitation is that this study is somewhat dated and access to ITNs and malaria prevalence in Madagascar has changed. The results of a similar experiment may be different now in the context of greater access to and experience with using ITNs, particularly as households already own an ITN or are seeking to provide coverage for other household members. Nonetheless, one of the challenges with malaria control is the need to sustain malaria control efforts and replace used ITNs that no longer provide adequate protection. There remains a coverage gap of 300 million ITNs according to the WHO (2015a) and households are making choices daily about obtaining and using ITNs depending on their demand for bednets at the prevailing price. This study's findings provide relevant information about how households in malaria-endemic regions interact with this health technology, a cornerstone of malaria control strategies.
Another limitation of this study is the relatively small sample size. First, the small number of villages leads to greater imbalance in baseline characteristics than would otherwise occur with a larger sample in a randomized experiment. Ideally, a randomized experiment would have many more randomized units per treatment arm and this would reduce the likelihood of chance differences in baseline characteristics across treatment groups. The sample size was largely determined based on budget constraints. The sample size ended up being imbalanced across treatment arms (i.e. there were more villages randomized to the no subsidy group) because it was less costly to include additional villages in that group. This imbalance would reduce our statistical power but would not affect our main findings. Although we control for baseline differences, there may exist unobservable characteristics that may bias the results. Additionally, distance to the central distribution point may vary by village. Although we restricted the sample of eligible villages to those within a five kilometer radius of Ambalavao, small variations may still exist.
Sample attrition may also affect the internal validity of the results. One potential source of bias may be related to the number of households by price category. There is no/less attrition in the two price categories with fewer randomized households, compared with other categories with more households. Specifically, the data collectors reported that it was more difficult to survey all households in villages with more households. We control for the number of households by village in the indices, yet differences in village size may not completely explain the attrition. In addition, we also observe certain differences in baseline characteristics for the analytic sample compared with the sample lost to follow-up. Our findings are consistent when we include probability weights to weight the analytic sample up to the experimental sample. However, these weights may not completely capture unobservable factors that influence sample attrition. Certainly, a larger number of randomized units would have helped mitigate concerns regarding internal validity.
We are not able to reject potentially meaningful sunk cost and screening effects because of the small sample size. In addition, we are limited in our interpretation of the screening effects since we lack an objective measure of malaria risk. Self-reported fevers may be endogenous, meaning that these self-reports are likely to be Robust SEs in parentheses. 95% CIs in square brackets. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. The regressions use a linear probability model. Each column represents a separate regression with the dependent variable indicated in the column heading. The independent variable of interest, defined as net price, represents the price category starting from zero, up to $2.20. Net price increases in increments of $0.55. Fever represents the percentage of household members that self-reported having had a fever during the previous month at baseline. This indicator is a proxy for malaria risk and the interaction is meant to isolate potential screening effects. Regressions (where marked) include baseline household level and village level characteristics (see Table 5 ), as well as a control variable for the education campaign and an interaction with net price. related to households' education level and this will also influence demand and use of ITNs. In this study, we were unable to collect blood smear samples. Not all fevers are due to malaria and are therefore an imperfect proxy of malaria risk. Nonetheless, the population's perception of malaria risk may be strongly tied to fevers because this is the main symptom that health providers used to educate households at that time about their malaria risk. Indeed, at the time, the Malagasy term tazo (fever) and tazo moka (fever from mosquitoes/ malaria) were used interchangeably in the villages. Even though our estimates are less precisely estimated, they are consistent with Cohen and Dupas (2010) in demonstrating the negative effect of price on both demand and use of ITNs among a general population at risk of malaria. By finding similar results to other studies but in a different country context and in the general population, our study further corroborates that price significantly limits demand for ITNs and effective coverage of ITNs.
Conclusion
The debate around the pricing of ITNs remains relevant as countries face funding gaps in achieving universal coverage of malaria control interventions and households at risk of malaria continue to lack access to ITNs. The optimal pricing of ITNs will continue to play an important role as countries transition away from free mass distribution campaigns towards more sustainable financing models. Our results demonstrate that even partial subsidization of ITNs significantly limits demand and effective coverage of ITNs. Rather than relying on partial subsidization of ITNs to maximize coverage of ITNs among poor populations at risk of malaria, alternative sources of financing should be identified to continue to finance free distribution. a household to demand an ITN as a function of village level characteristics, holding constant the price intervention and other individual level and household level characteristics. 8. Following Ashraf et al. (2010) , Cohen and Dupas (2010) use a randomized two-stage pricing design to separate, experimentally, the sunk cost and screening effects. Among the pregnant women willing to purchase an ITN at the randomly offered price, they are then randomly offered a price reduction. This second randomized price reduction, representing the actual price 'paid', captures the sunk cost effect, as opposed to the screening effect, captured by the price 'offered'. 9. Cameron et al. (2008) were not yet available in rural health centres in Madagascar, and access to microscopy was limited. 11. The observables that differ across price categories include years of schooling for the head of household and the spouse, ownership of cattle carts, ducks and chickens, roof material, distance to water source, percentage saying water source is far, type of water source, individuals going out at night, households with fevers in last month, and health seeking behaviour for fevers. 12. Cohen and Dupas (2010) also fail to reject a sunk cost effect of zero using an experimental approach. Their CI implies that the difference in conditional use will be 10% points if price is increased by $0.15. These results are assessing smaller price increases over a smaller range.
Appendix 1 Robust ses in parentheses. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Notes: These regressions are used to predict the propensity variables (propensity to own ITN, propensity to use ITN, and propensity to use ITN conditional on owning) which are normalized and used as regressors in the main specification to control for village level characteristics. Robust SEs in parentheses. 95% CIs in square brackets. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Notes: The regressions use a linear probability model. Each column represents a separate regression with the dependent variable indicated in the column heading. Net price represents the price category starting from zero, up to $2.20. Net price increases in increments of $0.55. Education intervention is a dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 if village was eligible for health education campaign. Net price X education intervention is an interaction term to assess where there is a differential effect of the education intervention by price level. Regressions (where marked) include baseline household level and village level characteristics (see Table 5 ). Robust SEs in parentheses. 95% CIs in square brackets. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Notes: The regressions use a linear probability model. The independent variable "Positive price for ITNs" is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if household is eligible to pay a price greater than 0. Dummy variable is 0 if household is eligible for free ITN. See Table 5 for a list of all baseline variables included in the specification. Robust SEs in parentheses. 95% CIs in square brackets. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Notes: The regressions use probit models and the reported coefficients represents marginal effects (dy/dx). The dependent variable Net price is defined as in Table 5 . See Table 5 for a list of all baseline variables included in regressions 1 and 2. In regression 3, the model cannot be estimated when the full set of baseline characteristics are included. Robust SEs in parentheses. 95% CIs in square brackets. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Notes: The specification is the same as the one used in the main results, including control variables for household-level variables (see Table 5 ), but uses village fixed effects rather than the propensity scores to control for village-level characteristics. Robust SEs in parentheses. 95% CIs in square brackets. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Notes: The specification is the same as the one used in the main results, including control variables for household-level and village-level control variables (see Table 5 ). Probability weights are used in the regressions to weight the sample up to the experimental sample (see Appendix section "Generating probability weights to adjust for non-response" for details on probability weights).
